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Small firms face distinct problems and opportunities when procuring IT resources. Whereas 
previous work focused at the firm level or the buyer-supplier dyad, the present study addresses the 
portfolios of the buyer’s exchange relationships with suppliers at an online marketplace for IT 
services. We draw on social network theory to measure portfolios as the buyer’s ego network. 
Using clustering techniques, we empirically derive a taxonomy of portfolios of small firms’ buying 
IT services and analyze cluster antecedents and outcomes. 
Our investigation reveals four clusters of buyers’ ego networks: transactional buyers, relational 
buyers, small diversifiers and large diversifiers. Each of these clusters has a distinct and different 
mix of long-term and short-term relationships with selected suppliers. Reverse auctions are found 
to be associated with a short-term exchange relationship orientation, while bilateral negotiations 
support long-term orientation. Buyers in different clusters use the two exchange mechanisms in 
combination to a different extent.  
Keywords:  Online markets, IT services, buyer-supplier relationships, reverse auctions.  
 
Introduction 
Traditionally, small firms face more difficulties accessing and using information technology (IT) resources, 
including access to IT outsourcing providers, than their larger counterparts (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005; Nooteboom, 
1993). However, with the growth of IT spending by small firms, wide-spread use of the Internet and emergence of a 
wide range of intermediaries, the situation has started to change. The recent rise of online marketplaces for 
professional services contributes to improving the access of small firms to offshore suppliers of outsourcing 
services. IT services, such as Web site design and software development, are a primarily focus for these 
marketplaces. The leading online marketplaces include Elance Online, Rent a Coder and eWork.  
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Marketplaces for IT services provide a valuable ground for studying a number of exchange-related issues of high 
theoretical and practical importance. Recent studies addressed bidding and buying behavior under costly bidding and 
bid evaluation (Carr, 2003; Snir & Hitt, 2003); market participation costs (Snir & Hitt, 2004) and buyer’s 
commitment and opportunism (Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2006). The present study focuses at two main 
themes that emerge in light of the increasing use of online IT marketplaces by small firms: the development of long-
term as opposed to short term buyer-supplier relationships and the underlying use and impact of exchange 
mechanisms (open reverse auctions versus negotiations).  
This study takes an exploratory approach. We aim at deriving a taxonomy of repeat buyers (small firms) of IT 
services based on buyers’ relationship orientation and exchange mechanism use. Ego networks, or portfolios of 
exchange relationships, have been chosen as a unit of analysis to enable the focus on the combination of these 
dimensions. The main research question this study intends to answer is this: What types of buyer ego networks are 
formed at online IT marketplaces for small firms?  
From a theoretical perspective, the study contributes to the understanding of the different configurations of buyer-
supplier relationships in online IT markets. From a managerial perspective, we provide insights into how online 
markets for IT services, while traditionally aimed at enabling short-term efficiencies, could also serve exchange 
relationships that rely on long-term considerations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss theoretical roots of the taxonomy dimensions. 
This is followed by a discussion of the methodology, the data, and the analytical procedures. Finally, we discuss the 
empirical findings and formulate conclusions and theoretical and managerial contributions. 
Theoretical Background: Portfolios of Exchange Relationships 
As the objective of this paper is to explore empirical configurations of buyer-supplier relationships and buyers’ use 
of exchange mechanisms, we chose to focus on the buyer ego network as a unit of analysis. An ego network consists 
of an ego (central node or firm in our case), alters (the nodes or firms the central firm is connected to), ties between 
ego and alters (in our case, projects between the buyer and suppliers) and ties between alters (the latter is not 
applicable in our case as the different bidders do not have a relationship). The concept of ego network in social 
network analysis resonates with the concept of “portfolio of relationships” in the marketing literature. For instance, 
Bensaou, (1999) used this concept in his study of the relationships between manufacturing companies in the 
automotive industry and their suppliers. Similarly, by using ego networks or portfolio of relationships in the present 
study, we are able to capture the key dimensions of interest in the taxonomy development as structural or 
compositional properties of ego networks. In the remainder of the paper we are using both terms (buyer ego 
networks and portfolios of relationships) interchangeably.  
The literature tradition in both inter-organizational relationships and information systems contains confirmatory and 
exploratory approaches to empirical research. Confirmatory approaches take a taxonomy deduced from extant 
literature and test for the occurrence of pre-defined constructs and types, whereas exploratory approaches derive the 
taxonomy inductively from the data and then relate them back to theory. While traditionally the confirmatory 
approach has tended to dominate, exploratory approaches have been used effectively as well, particularly in 
situations where existing theory was deemed insufficiently detailed to do justice to the richness of the field setting. 
In the area of inter-organizational relationships the exploratory approach has been employed to extract and analyze 
empirical patterns of inter-organizational relationships and sometimes to relate them to their antecedents and 
performance characteristics (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; Cannon & Perreault Jr, 1999). In the information 
systems literature the exploratory approach has been used to develop the taxonomy of eBay buyers and relate 
resulting buyer types to auction winning likelihood and extracted surplus (Bapna et al., 2004). 
Taxonomy Dimensions 
Inter-organizational Relationships 
The two polar modes of interorganizational exchange relationships are transactional and relational exchange. 
Transactional exchange is characterized by short-term, arm’s-length transactions with a competitive attitude  (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). Four characteristics of transactional exchange are: 1) nonspecific asset investments, 2) minimal 
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information exchange, 3) separate technological and functional systems within each party; low interdependence 
between the systems; 4) low transaction costs and minimal investments in governance (Dyer et al.., 1998). While in 
transactional exchange firms exploit market efficiencies to derive one-time profit, in the relational exchange firms 
are seeking “relational rent” over a longer period of time and/ or over a series of transactions (Ganesan, 1994). In the 
relational exchange, parties rely on relational attributes, such as trust, commitment, collaboration, information 
sharing, etc. (Dyer et al.., 1998; Ganesan, 1994).  
While in the literature on interorganizational relationships a lot of efforts have been invested into the research on the 
stages and processes of relationships development (Narayandas & Kasturi, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) and the 
interplay between transactional and relational elements of exchange (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Radkevitch & van der 
Valk, 2005), relatively little has been said on the role and development of relationships in situations that are 
characterized of both transactional and relational exchange. These can be, for example software development 
projects, where parties work jointly on system requirements, develop functional specifications, solve problems 
during the project run and deploy the application. While we do not set out to explore how relationships develop over 
time, we do try to uncover the empirical types of relationships from the viewpoint of short versus long-term 
orientation.  
Reverse Auctions  
An auction is defined as “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices 
on the basis of bids from participants” (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). In reverse auctions suppliers compete online 
for a contract to supply goods or services to the buyer and the prices go down. On one hand, reverse auctions 
stimulate competition among suppliers (Carter, Kaufmann, Beall, & Carter, 2004; Jap, 2003) and make them 
concerned about buyer’s opportunistic behavior (Jap, 2003). On the other hand, reverse auctions are compatible with 
several dimensions of relational exchange, as reverse auctions can be used to source long-term contracts, can co-
exist with a high level of trust (Radkevitch et al.., 2005) and collaborative buyer-supplier relationships (Smart & 
Harrison, 2003). In addition, in real-life situations, bidder and buyer behavior is influenced by a variety of factors 
that are not covered in existing auction theory (Jap, 2002). Therefore, the extent of the use of reverse auctions by 
repeat buyers is the second dimension of our taxonomy. 
Transaction Characteristics 
Transaction cost economics regards transaction characteristics as a determinant of exchange governance 
(Williamson, 1985). High level of transaction attributes such as frequency of transactions, asset specificity and 
technological uncertainty calls for hierarchical exchange governance to minimize the transaction costs. While 
hierarchies are efficient in keeping down costs of coordinating complex transactions, market governance is 
advantageous when transactions are less complex and exchange efficiency is achieved due to low costs of 
production (Williamson, 1985). In a similar fashion, transaction attributes become important when choosing an 
exchange mechanism. For instance, more complex construction projects, where ex-post negotiations are likely, are 
found to be more appropriate for negotiations, while less complex contracts with no ex-post negotiations fit well 
competitive bidding (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). Therefore, our third dimension is related to the complexity 
characteristics of IT projects. 
Antecedents of Portfolio Composition 
Several constructs can shed light on the emergence of the clusters of buyers and their performance outcomes and 
also contribute to the validity of our taxonomy.  
Buyer Commitment/ Opportunism  
This construct was introduced in Radkevitch et al.. (2006, where it was explored on the level of individual 
transaction and shown to influence the likelihood that a contract will be awarded. Here we extend its use to the level 
of portfolio of relationships (ego networks) in order to explore its impact on the way portfolios are organized.  
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Buyer Experience 
Taking into account buyer’s experience at the marketplace is important at least from the viewpoint that more 
experience means, ceteris paribus, that a buyer has worked on more projects and with larger overall budget. More 
experience allows more room for the development of long-term relationships with suppliers. 
Performance Characteristics 
Buyer Satisfaction 
We intend to explain buyer satisfaction with the supplier performance as a performance characteristic related to 
different clusters. Throughout the literature, higher satisfaction is associated with a higher level of relational 
elements in the inter-organizational exchange (Griffith et al., 2006; Poppo et al.., 2002). 
The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Buyer Portfolio Clusters Determinants, Antecedents and Outcomes 
Methodology 
Empirical Setting 
The transaction data were obtained from a leading online marketplace for professional services, used by around 
60.000 buyers. The range of services encompasses IT services and other professional services (e.g. translation, 
accounting, etc.). Software application development is one of the most populated areas of the marketplace. Buyers 
are businesses and individuals predominantly from the US, while suppliers are small/ medium IT companies and 
freelancers located in India, Eastern Europe and Russia.  
The exchange process is as follows. Before buyers and suppliers are able to enter the exchange they are required to 
register at the marketplace. Participation for buyers is free of charge while a periodical fee applies to suppliers (the 
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latter also pay a commission on accomplished transactions). The buyer starts an auction by posting a request for 
proposals (RFP). The allocation mechanism comes in two basic types: open auctions (all suppliers can bid) and 
invite-only auctions (only invited suppliers can bid). In 95% of cases there is only one supplier in the invite-only 
auctions, therefore we consider the invite-only auctions to be bilateral negotiations. In the open auctions the 
different suppliers are bidding and the buyer chooses the winner (which might not necessarily be the lowest bidder). 
The buyer is able to rate supplier’s performance. The accumulated supplier’s rating is a part of the reputation and 
trust mechanism at the marketplace. 
Data 
We collected data on projects procured by buyers who were the most active in the Web Development, the most 
populated sub-marketplace. These included not only IT-related projects but also project from other areas of the 
online marketplace, as buyers typically do not confine their activities to a single sub-marketplace.  
There were several stages in data collection and processing. First, we focused on repeat buyers with a considerable 
exchange track record at the marketplace to ensure that each buyer had done enough projects to make up a 
reasonable portfolio. We identified most active buyers using a cut-off level of 20 awarded projects (this included all 
projects awarded at the marketplace, not only IT-related). This resulted in a sample of 530 buyers that awarded 20 to 
300 projects each from 1999 until May 2006. 
Second, we filtered out project from outside IT categories (namely, Web design and development and Application 
development) and projects with incomplete data, e.g. where buyer feedback on supplier performance was absent. In 
case the feedback on at least 70% buyer’s of projects was available (which is the cut-off level we chose to ensure a 
reasonable amount of data in an ego network), the ego network was included in the further analysis. 
The procedure resulted in 105 ego networks containing data on 2,193 projects worth a total of USD 1,135,041.  
Kapow RoboSuite software was used for web data extraction; MS Excel and SPSS were employed at the stage of 
data processing and analysis.  
Operationalization  
Table 1 summarizes the variables that operationalize our three taxonomy dimensions: relationship characteristics, 
reverse auction use and transaction characteristics as well as the antecedents and performance characteristics.  Table 
3 provides details on the 4-cluster solution. 
Table 1. Cluster Dimensions, Antecedents, Outcomes and their Measures 
Taxonomy dimensions 
Relationship characteristics • Share of projects per supplier with the highest number of 
transactions (%);  
• Duration of relationships with the most often used supplier 
(days). 
Reverse auction use • Share of projects procured via open reverse auctions (%). 
Transaction characteristics • Portfolio size (USD); 
• Average project price (USD); 
• Average project length (days). 
Cluster antecedents 
Buyer commitment/ opportunism  • Number of awarded projects divided by number of posted 
projects  
Buyer experience  
 
• Total spend (USD) 
• Overall number of awarded projects 
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• Duration of the presence at the marketplace (days) 
Performance characteristics 
Buyer satisfaction • Average satisfaction rating  
Analysis  
Cluster analysis consists of two stages: identification of the number of clusters and clustering observations in the 
sample. While there is normally little uncertainty with regard to the second stage, the first one can be realized in a 
variety of ways. In the present study we chose to apply rather simple and elegant solution suggested by Bapna et al.. 
(2004).   
First, we applied K-means clustering method to find a number of different cluster solutions for our dataset. The 
method clusters objects into k partitions based on their attributes. The method assumes that the attributes form a 
vector space and aims to minimize total within-cluster variance. It is commonly used in the IS and marketing studies 
as a part of the procedure to established typologies of actors, e.g. bidders (Bapna et al.., 2004) or buyers (Bensaou 
and Venkatraman, 1994; Cannon and Perreault, 1996).   
Second, as advised by Bapna et al.. (2004), for each cluster solution we calculated average distance from points in a 
cluster to the relevant cluster center (intra-cluster distance) and minimum distance between cluster centers among all 
clusters (intercluster distance). Better cluster solutions have smaller intra-cluster distances (the clusters are more 
homogeneous) and larger intercluster distances (the clusters are situated more apart from each other). Then, we 
establish the optimal solution by dividing intercluster difference of a cluster by intra-cluster difference of the same 
cluster, which is dissimilarity ratio (Bapna et al.., 2004), and comparing them. The optimal cluster should have the 
highest dissimilarity ratio. According to the results in Table 2, in our case the first solution is the one with five 
clusters containing 11, 45, 5, 35 and 9 ego networks respectively.  
Table 2. Dissimilarity Ratio 
Number of clusters in 
a solution 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dissimilarity ratio 1.352 1.501 1.611 1.701 1.124 1.261 1.189 1.172 1.210 
 
However, after comparing the 5-cluster solution with the 4-cluster solution (43, 43, 10 and 9 ego networks) we 
found only one main difference between them. This is that the 9-member cluster of the 4-cluster solution has split 
into two clusters and, combined with four members of a 43-member cluster, made up the 5 and 9-member clusters of 
the 5-cluster solution (we do not provide details on the cluster composition here due to space constraints). The 
composition of the other clusters remained mostly unchanged. Taking into account the similarity of the 4 and 5 
cluster solutions, the marginal difference in their dissimilarity ratio and the small size of three clusters in the 5-
cluster solution, it was decided to base the further analysis on the 4-clusters solution. 
Based on the characteristics of ego networks in the clusters we came up with the following names for the buyers in 
these clusters: Transactional buyers, Relational buyers, Small diversifiers and Large diversifiers. The labels were 
assigned on the basis of how buyers seem to manage their suppliers and use exchange mechanisms.  
Cluster 1. Transactional buyers. Most projects in ego networks of this type are procured via open reverse auctions 
(71%). Transactional buyers allocate 31% of projects to a single preferred supplier, the lowest level among all 
clusters, and also have the shortest duration of relationships with this supplier, 242 days. Interestingly, while their 
average project price is the smallest among all clusters (USD 390), their projects take longer to accomplish (47 days) 
than more expensive projects of Relational buyers (USD 486 and 31 days respectively). One possible explanation is 
that it takes longer for Transactional buyers to set up a sound communication and coordination with new suppliers.   
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Share of projects 
per supplier with 
most projects, % 31 76 62 56 .000 
Duration of 
relationships with 
the supplier with 
most projects 226 581 867 806 .000 
Share of reverse 
auctions, % 71 19 43 33 .000 
Portfolio size 
(USD) 7,664 9,366 8,236 35,685 .000 
Average project 
price (USD) 390 486 458 1577 .000 
Average project 
length (days) 47 31 119 64 .000 
N 43 43 10 9  
 
Cluster 2. Relational buyers. These buyers use open reverse auctions the least of all four types (19% of cases). Their 
project value is higher than that of Transactional buyers (USD 486), which might be due not only to the projects’ 
sheer size and complexity but also to the fact that Transactional buyers receive lower prices because of competitive 
bidding at reverse auctions. Another distinguishing factor is the allocation of a higher share of projects (76%) to a 
single preferred supplier. The duration of relationships with the preferred supplier, although being two times higher 
than the one of Transactional buyers, still falls considerably behind those of the both Diversifiers clusters. As the 
buyers in this cluster mostly use bilateral negotiations and allocate over ¾ of projects to a single long-term supplier 
we term them “Relational buyers”.  
Clusters 3 and 4. Small diversifiers and Large diversifiers. The two remaining clusters exhibit more similarities than 
differences, therefore we analyze them together. Considering the moderate levels of reverse auction use and a rather 
high share of projects allocated to the preferred supplier, we suggest that buyers in both these clusters might be 
combining long-term suppliers with a fair share of short-term, transactional relationships. Hence the choice of the 
name– “diversifiers”. Buyers in these clusters prefer to allocate projects via negotiations over auctions, the latter 
being used in 43% and 33% of cases respectively. Similarly, they favor single preferred suppliers (allocating to them 
62% and 56% of projects), although to lower extent than Relational buyers. The duration of their relationships with 
the preferred suppliers is equally long – 867 and 806 days respectively. The differences between Small Diversifiers 
and Large diversifiers lie in the size of the portfolio, in which Large diversifiers are far ahead any other cluster 
(USD 35,685) and the project length. With regard to the latter, Small diversifiers have the lead with 119 days, which 
is almost two times higher than the project length of Large diversifiers, whose project value is over three times 
higher. A possible reason is that these are smaller firms or individuals lacking project management skills or have one 
or several extremely long projects that affect the average project length.  
The next step in the analysis is to determine the links between clusters and their antecedents and performance. We 
conduct ANOVA to test for significance of the differences between the means of the variables that underlie the 
antecedents and outcomes, see Table 4. With regards to the antecedents, all differences between the means are 
significant. The difference in the level of satisfaction is not significant.  
Buyer commitment/ opportunism. The analysis shows a linkage between the relatively low project award rate and 
two clusters: Transactional buyers and Small diversifiers. This can hardly be explained by the properties of the 
projects such as complexity and uncodifiability, as the projects come from rather homogenous categories. Also, it 
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cannot be explained by the differences in the project value, as it is only marginally higher for Transactional buyers 
and Small diversifiers than for Relational buyers and is much lower than in Large Diversifiers cluster. A plausible 
explanation, in line with Radkevitch et al.. (2006), is that Transactional buyers and Small diversifiers are more 
opportunistic and have a tendency to post projects without awarding them to suppliers. Instead, they might 
sometimes use the marketplace for price benchmarking or obtaining free advice from suppliers (Radkevitch et al.., 
2006). 
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N (listwise) 43 43 10 9  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1  
Buyer experience. There are no drastic differences between Transactional and Relational buyer in terms of their 
experience. Although Transactional buyers have been marginally longer present at the marketplace (1,593 versus 
1,352 days) and have a higher overall number of awarded projects (this means not only IT-related projects but also 
project in other sub-marketplaces), the volume of their spent is lower (USD 27,891 versus USD 32,887). A likely 
conclusion is that the ego networks of transactional type reflect a deliberate stance of buyers toward organizing their 
exchange relationships, rather than a universal stage in the evolution of ego networks.  
With regard to diversifiers, although Small diversifiers have been present at the marketplace for almost as long as 
Large diversifiers, they are much less active both in terms of the number of awarded project and overall transaction 
volume. This might be related to a smaller size of these firms (for which we, unfortunately, are unable to control).  
Buyer satisfaction. The lack of significance in the level of satisfaction between different clusters is most probably 
due to that fact that buyers use performance ranking mostly to reward or punish suppliers, rather than to objectively 
rank the performance. Over 90% of ranked projects have the highest possible rating. Another possibility is that 
buyers succeed in choosing the right suppliers given their strategic objectives, thus constantly achieving the highest 
possible outcome.  
Discussion and Conclusions  
There are several key findings in the present study. First, our exploratory approach revealed the existence of four 
clusters of repeat buyers at the marketplace – transactional buyers, relational buyers and small diversifiers and large 
diversifiers. These labels were derived on the basis of buyers’ exchange relationships orientation and their use of 
exchange mechanisms. While transactional buyers tend to switch suppliers often, relational buyers develop long-
term dyads with selected suppliers. The existence of a relatively large cluster of buyers that rely on long-term 
relationships with the suppliers comes somewhat as a surprise, as the marketplace positioning and functionality 
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emphasizes a competitive, transactional way of procuring IT services. The clusters of Small and Large diversifiers 
seem to combine both arm’s-length and close ties with their suppliers. The high levels of experience across all 
clusters indicates that these clusters are not simply intermediary stages of the evolution of buyer’s ego networks, but 
rather deliberate stances that are defined by an inherent intention of different buyers to pursue different relationship 
strategies. 
Second, reverse auctions are found to be associated with a short-term relationship orientation, while bilateral 
negotiations support relational orientation. However, even relational buyers use open reverse auctions to a certain 
extent. This is a sign that different exchange mechanisms may be used interchangeably at different stages of the 
development of supplier portfolios. For instance, a buyer can first select one or several sequential projects via the 
competitive open auction procedure. At a later stage, when the supplier’s quality has been proven and longer-term 
relationships start to emerge, the buyer switches to a non-competitive bilateral negotiation procedure. Similarly, a 
relational buyer can occasionally hold an auction to check whether or not a better supplier has become available in 
the meantime and then possibly switch to the new supplier and build a relationship with that supplier. Therefore, 
while transactional buyers use reverse auctions for an optimal project allocation though competitive bidding, 
relational buyers use reverse auctions as a screening instrument, substituted with bilateral negotiation for further 
projects once the trust in a supplier has been established.  
Third, this study has implications for practice. We showed that long-term cooperative relationships do develop 
between at competitive marketplaces for IT services. As the reliance on relational elements in a bilateral exchange is 
growing, the need for the mechanisms of formal governance (e.g. formal terms and conditions, arbitration, rating 
systems) decreases and the parties become less dependent on the marketplace for further transactions. As the costs 
of carrying out exchange via online marketplace exceed the benefits, the established buyer-supplier dyads may leave 
the marketplace and embark on off-market exchange. To prevent buyer-supplier dyads from leaving, online 
marketplaces need to cater for “relational” exchange. They must address key characteristics of such exchange, such 
as it long-term nature; intensive information exchange and re-use of accumulated knowledge. In other words, the 
online marketplaces for IT services need to provide a collaboration platform for relational exchanges. 
One interesting direction for further research might testing the generalisability of the presented finding across other 
online marketplaces and service categories as well as across firms of larger sizes. Another potential direction is the 
study of the dynamics of ego networks evolution. 
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